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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
THE DEFINITION OF DISABILITY IN SOCIAL
SECURITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY
INCOME: DRAWING THE BOUNDS OF
SOCIAL WELFARE ESTATES
Lance Liebman *
Federal aid to the disabled is a vast enterprise; over nine bil-
lion dollars are annually paid to five million beneficiaries. In this
Article, Professor Liebman points out how the ad hoc nature of so-
cial welfare legislation and programming has resulted in a system
that produces inconsistent and sometimes inequitable determinations
of disability. The present system, he argues, draws significant eco-
nomic and social distinctions among the disabled, as well as distinc-
tions between the disabled and the unemployed, that have been
inadequately explained and justified. By focusing on worker ex-
pectations generated by the administration of our disability programs,
and on the structural relationships established between the different
programs, Professor Liebman suggests a set of principles to guide
future legislative developments and judicial decisions.
T HE American social welfare system consists of the accu-
mulated expressions of intermittent liberal-reformist mo-
mentum. Statutory guarantees have provided increasingly
broader protection for workers against income loss caused by
declines in capacity to work or in labor market demand for
services. But this legislation has rarely been accompanied by
systematic discussion of the appropriate scope and function of
public protection. Programs are designed and recommended by
assorted groups of the affected and the committed. Then, when
the votes are available, when a need is felt, when a platform is
required, new arrangements make their way toward law.'
* Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. B.A., Yale, 1962; B.A.,
Cambridge, 1964; LL.B., Harvard, 1967.
1 For discussion and analysis of America's inconsistent path toward social wel-
fare protection, see R. LUBOVE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 1900-1935
(1968); G. STEINER, THE STATE OF WELFARE (1971); F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD,
REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS or PUBLIC WELFARE (1971); THE PRINCE-
TON SYmPosium ON THE AmERicAN SYSTEM OF SOCIAL INSURANCE (W. Bowen ed.
1968); R. LEVY, T. LEwIs & P. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SOCIAL WELFARE
AND THE INDIVIDUAL (197i); Bok, Emerging Issues in Social Legislation: Social Se-
curity, 8o HAIRv. L. REV. 717 (1967). Concerning our processes and style for de-
ciding such questions, the story of the abortive Family Assistance Plan is enlighten-
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This disjointed political process has three consequences. First,
citizens have difficulty understanding the social welfare system.
Programs are complicated, misleading, and often incompatible.
It is hard for an individual to determine his eligibilities, and im-
possible for him to discern a consistent rationale for those eligi-
bilities. It is all too easy for a recipient to believe that his
situation is unfair: that he is discriminated against or that others
with no greater claim receive better treatment.2  Second, many
important issues of eligibility are not resolved by Congress. In
effect, these decisions are delegated to federal and state admin-
istrative agencies and to the courts.' In the absence of legis-
lative guidance, however, such delegation is bound to produce
inconsistent results since agencies and courts have no generally
accepted theoretical assumptions by which to structure the boun-
daries of social welfare protection.' Third, a' desultory social
welfare system tends toward permanence. Complicated, com-
partmentalized programs encourage tenacious defense of spe-
cific advantages. Thus efforts for evaluation and alteration are
denied broad political supportP
We very much need theories of welfare state protection: rea-
sons why Smith is paid and Green not, or why Smith's check
comes only if he labors and Green's only after a lecture from a
social worker. Some commentators, however, have argued to
the contrary, contending that the lack of theoretical underpin-
ing. A reasonably complete account can be assembled from the quite different
perspectives of D. MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME (1973);
V. & V. BURKE, NixoN'S GOOD DEED: WELFARE REFORM (1974); H. AARON, VHY
IS WELFARE So HARD TO REFORM? (1973).
2 See generally M. BARTH, G. CARCAGNO & J. PALMER, TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE
INCOME SUPPORT SYSTEM: PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS, AND CHOICES (2974); D.
MOYNIHAN, supra note I, at 17-6o; SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISCAL POLICY, JOINT
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 92D CONG., 2D SESS. & 93D CONG., IST SESS., STUDIES IN
PUBLIC WELFARE (Comm. Print 1972-73); J. HANDLER, REFORMING THE POOR:
WELFARE POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND MORALITY (1972); F. Wiseman, "Welfare,"
movie shown on National Educational Television, September 24, 1975.
' See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408 (1970) (state discretion in fix-
ing "standard of need") ; Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (972) (state discre-
tion in determining relative benefit levels for different programs); New York
State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 423 U.S. 405 (973) (state discretion in
determining and administering work requirements).
' The AFDC program in particular has generated conflicting judicial assessments
of legislative purpose. Compare King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325 (2968) (Warren,
C. 3.), with Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 645 (2969) (Warren, C. J.,
dissenting). Compare Carleson v. Remillard, 4o6 U.S. 598 (1972) (Douglas, J.),
with Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (971) (Blackmun, J.). Compare Rosado v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (I97O) (Harlan, J.), with New York State Dep't of Social
Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (I973) (Powell, J.).
I See generally H. AARON, supra note I, at 3z-46.
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nings permits the social welfare system to pay more to the poor
than it would if programs and their purposes were better under-
stood, and that current programmatic confusion is therefore de-
sirable.' But this analysis is unsound, even by its own result-
oriented standards. Undisciplined social programming may help
some individuals, but it neglects others, and the latter group are
often among those least able to fend for themselves economically,
politically, and bureaucratically.7 Incoherent programs may pay
out a great deal of money, but they are politically vulnerable in
times of fiscal crunch because they make satisfaction of recip-
ients' claims a matter of charity rather than of right. Develop-
ment of a principled theory of welfare state protection, therefore,
is more than pursuit of the hobgoblin of consistency. It is ab-
solutely necessary if we are to achieve fair and comprehensive
income protection commitments that are secure against changing
politics.
Two giant federal programs, Social Security and Supplemen-
tal Security Income (SSI), provide benefits to persons perma-
nently and totally disabled.' Within each of these statutory
schemes, a finding of "disability" serves the function of admit-
ting a recipient to a favored status in the welfare state. There-
fore, the conditions of qualification imposed by Congress, the
Social Security Administration, and reviewing courts should tell
us something about our ideas of desert and priority in social
welfare protection. By examining how these three institutions
have defined disability, and have thereby drawn the boundaries
of coverage and eligibility under the two statutes, this Article
I See B. BLECHmAN, E. GRAmLiCH & R. HAR~mrA, SETTING NATIONAL PRi-
ORITIES: THE 1975 BUDGEr 187-89 (Brookings Inst. 1974) ; Wall St. J., July 3, 1975,
at 6, col. 3 (interview with Gilbert Steiner, Director of Government Studies at the
Brookings Institution).
7To the extent that rules and procedures are complicated, those with greater
ability or will to master the system obtain more funds. To the extent that results
vary capriciously, those who can influence unprincipled political decisions do best.
To the extent that unchecked discretion is lodged in bureaucrats, those who can
pressure them prevail. Thus, those who cannot deal with bureaucracies are treated
badly even by the one system which purports to be concerned with them. See
M. BARTH, G. CARCAGNO & J. PALMER, supra note 2; SUBCOMMvITTEE ON FISCAL
PoLIcY, JOINT ECONOmIC CommITTEE, STUDIES IN PUBLIC WELFARE, Paper No. 5,
Part I, "Welfare-An Administrative Nightmare" (Comm. Print 1972); Lieb-
man, Social Intervention in a Democracy, 34 THE PUB. INTEREST 14 (1974).
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 423 (X970) (Social Security disability program) ; id. §§ 1381-
85 (Supp. I1, 1973) (Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind and
Disabled). In fiscal year 1974, approximately 3,700,000 persons received more
than 7.5 billion dollars in Social Security disability benefits, see Mathews v. Eldridge,
44 U.S.L.W. 4224, 4226 n.i (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976); 38 SoC. SEC. BULL. 31 (975),
and another i,3oo,ooo received approximately 1.8 billion dollars in SSI benefits by
reason of disability or blindness, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1976, at 32, col. 2.
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explores the principles that underlie our social welfare system.
These principles are then applied in an attempt to delineate boun-
daries more appropriate than those that now define the Social
Security and SSI welfare estates.
I. SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
"Social Security" was established in 1935.' A payroll tax, with
proceeds earmarked for a trust fund, was imposed on employees
and employers. 10 By 1940, persons who had worked enough
days under Social Security to "earn" a pension began to retire."
' Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
3o-o6 (197o)). On the origins of the Social Security program, see 3 A. SCHLE-
sINGER, THE AGE OF RoosEvELT: THE CoMING OF THE NEw DEAL 297-315
(1959); E. WirrE, FI LECTuREs oN SoCIAL SECURITy (i95i); A. ALT=!YER,
THE FoRATrvE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY (1966).
' Social Security Act, ch. 531, tit. VIII, § 8ox, 49 Stat. 636 (1935) (tax on em.
ployees of 1% of wages, escalating in steps to 3% after 1948) ; id. tit. IX, § 9oi,
49 Stat. 639 (i935) (similar tax on employers). The term "trust fund" was first
employed in the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, tit. II, ch. 201, 53 Stat.
1362 (1939). Social Security is actually two programs, one that taxes and one that
spends. In a neat sleight of hand, President Roosevelt took both to the public as
one arrangement, an image essential to the message that the program was like a
contract, and that individuals were depositing funds for their own later need. The
legislation was drafted in an atmosphere of concern about Supreme Court review
of the program, fueled by the Court's earlier invalidation of the railroad retirement
scheme, see Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S.'330 (1935). The
Committee on Economic Security, which prepared the legislation, concluded that
Social Security's chances would be increased if its taxing and pension-paying
components could be bifurcated. At least some evidence for this prediction came
from a reliable source:
In 1934, when Frances Perkins had confided to Justice Stone her worries
about the constitutionality of a social-security system, Stone whispered back,
"The taxing power of the Federal Government, my dear; the taxing power
is sufficient for everything you want and need."
3 A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF ROosEVELT: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 398 (1969).
This was not the only advisory opinion on Social Security. See ROOSEVELT &
FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE 1928-1945, at 224 (M. Freedman ed. x967)
(letter from Tom Corcoran and Ben Cohen in Washington to Frankfurter in Ox-
ford, June I8, 1934: "With Ray~mond Moleyl's help we managed to have the
President call in Isaiah [justice Brandeis] on Isaiah's last day here, to discuss the
social insurance message before it became public . . ").
However informed, the strategy succeeded. The Supreme Court upheld the
taxing and pension programs on the same day. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 3o
U.S. 548 (1937) (tit. IX) ; Helvering v. Davis, 3o U.S. 619 (1937) (tit. VIII).
"' Between 1936 and 1940, persons who retired received a lump sum payment
that was in effect the return of the Social Security taxes that they and their em-
ployers had paid. Social Security Act, ch. 53I, § 204, 49 Stat. 624 (1935). Initial
retirees in 194o had to have earned $2,ooo at covered employment on no less than
five work days in five different calendar years. Id., ch. 531, §§ 210(c)(2)-(3),
49 Stat. 625 (1935). Eligibility now depends on having worked sufficient
"quarters" at covered employment, a concept introduced in 195o, see Social Security
[Vol. 89:833
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Each month retirees received "insurance proceeds," although of
course the early recipients received far more than their own con-
tributions, and were paid with the taxes levied on persons still
working. 2 From its inception, the Social Security retirement
program has exhibited two general -and not entirely compat-
ible- characteristics. On the one hand, certain features of the
program, such as the relation of retirement benefits to wages
earned during an individual's working years 13 and the continued
eligibility for benefits of retired persons with substantial assets,'4
reflect an insurance theme. On the other hand, Social Security
has attempted to assure a minimum income for aged citizens, for
example by setting a benefit floor regardless of prior wages -' and
by providing additional benefits for spouses.1
6
Social Security has thus been both an enforced individual sav-
Act Amendments of I95O, ch. 809, § 213, 64 Stat. 5o4-o5 (I950). A "quarter" is
three consecutive months during which an individual earns covered wages of $50 or
more. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2) (1970)).
12 Social Security keeps records on earnings and tax payments credited to in-
dividual workers, hut it has never had separate cash payout accounts for each wage
earner. At the outset, the Administration had to devise a financial accomodation
that would permit larger payments to retirees in the early years than their short
participation in the program could justify. The Economic Security Committee's
original plan was for the government to "borrow" these early-year taxes in order
to make immediate benefit payments, and then repay the loan with interest begin-
ning in the i96o's, but Roosevelt insisted that the infusion of general revenues (in
effect paying back the original loan) be postponed until 198o. See TWENTiETH
CENTURY FuND, REPORT ON OLD-AGE SEcuRITY' (I938); A: ALTmEYER, supra note
9, at i1-26. In 295o, the bookkeeping fiction of carrying the early "loans" with
interest was dropped. Today the trust fund is at best a reserve against brief eco-
nomic calamity (it contains enough money to pay benefits for only a few months
if no new revenues are received), and a political safeguard for Social Security
revenues against competition from other spending opportunities (no different, in
that sense, from the highway trust fund). The fact that early retirees received
benefits financed by funds "borrowed" from the Social Security system suggests
a possible handle for appropriating general revenues to Social Security without
disabusing the public of the "insurance" analogy. See Hearings Before the Senate
Special Committee on Aging, 93d Cong., ist Sess., pt. 4, at 252 (1973) (testimony of
HEW Secretary Cohen) (advocating possible "Government subsidy" for "the
deficit . . . accrued during the transition period" to avoid having people think
of Social Security "as a welfare program").
12 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 415(a) (Supp. I1, I973) (computation of "primary
insurance amount" on basis of "average monthly wage"), with Social Security Act,
tit. II, ch. 531, § 202, 49 Stat. 623 (1935) (old age benefit payments based on "total
wages"). As of December io, 1975, a aingle person whose average yearly wage for
the 19 years before retirement was $5,500 receives $304.70 in monthly Social
Security benefits.
4But earned income before the age of 72 results in diminished Social Security
benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 403 (970).
1 Id. § 402 (m).
"I1d. §§ 402 (b)-(c).
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ings plan and a redistributive minimum-income welfare pro-
gram."7 Nevertheless, the government has worked hard and
successfully to persuade citizens that Social Security is insurance
that has been earned and paid for by those who receive benefits.
There is no conceivable doubt that responsible public authorities
wished citizens to rely, emotionally and practically, on the fu-
ture availability of Social Security benefits,' 8 even though Con-
"7 The argument that Social Security can best be understood as a "tax transfer"
program rather than as an "insurance purchase" program was first advanced by
Paul Samuelson in An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest With or With-
out the Social Contrivance of Money, 66 J. POL. EcoN. 467 (1958). See also J.
BRiTTAjN, THE PAYROLL TAX FOR SocrA SECURITY (972); Campbell, Social In-
surance in the United States: A Program in Search of an Explanation, 12 J. LAW
& EcoN. 249 (1969).
Those who believe that Social Security as packaged and operated has been im-
mensely successful are obliged to acknowledge the accuracy of this description, but
they remain passionate that moves to make the reality-that Social Security is a
tax transfer program and not an aggregation of personal insurance policies-more
visible would be a mistake. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Special Committee
on Aging, supra note I2, at 251-52 (testimony of former HEW Secretary Cohen).
18 "The hope behind this statute is to save men and women from the rigors of
the poor house as well as from the haunting fear that such a lot awaits them when
journey's end is near." Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937) (Cardozo,
J.).
Among the public expressions that accompanied inception of Social Security,
the following are typical:
A Federal old age insurance system, the largest undertaking of its kind
ever attempted, has been organized and under it there have been set up
individual accounts covering 42,500,000 persons who may be likened to the
policy holders of a private insurance company.
A Message Transmitting to the Congress a Report of the Social Security Board
Recommending Certain Improvements in the Law, Jan. 16, 1939, z939 THIE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANxLIN D. RoosEvELT 77 (1941).
The Act provides for two kinds of insurance for the worker.
For that insurance both the employer and the worker pay premiums,
just as you pay premiums on any other insurance policy. Those premiums
are collected in the form of the taxes you hear so much about.
The first kind of insurance covers old age. Here the employer contributes
one dollar of premium for every dollar of premium contributed by the
worker; but both dollars are held by the Government solely for the benefit
of the worker in his old age.
In effect, we have set up a savings account for the old age of the
worker ....
These propagandists [employers who oppose Social Security] ... are
driven in their desperation to the contemptible, unpatriotic suggestion that
some future Congress will steal these insurance funds for other purposes. If
they really believe what they say in the [literature being inserted by em-
ployers in workers'] pay envelopes, they have no confidence in our form
of government or its permanence. It might be well for them to move to some
other nation in which they have greater faith.
Campaign Address on John Mitchell Day at Wilkes-Barre, Pa., Oct. 29, x936, 1936
TnE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANE:L D. ROOSEvELT 548 (2938).
A similar theme permeated the program's early public literature. E.g., U.S.
Comm. ON EcoNoMoc SECURITY, WHAT THE EcoNoMISc SECURITY PROGRAM MEANS
To You (1935). J. Douglas Brown, writing of his service on the staff of the
Committee on Economic Security, has said: "[W]e wanted our government to
[Vol. 89:833
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gress inserted statutory language reserving the power to change
the program.19 Sensible citizens have relied on these official
promises in determining the extent of private provision it is rea-
sonable for them to make.20 For its part, the government has
rarely disappointed these expectations.2 ' The most recent con-
gressional initiative was a 1973 law that provided for automatic
increases in benefit levels to keep pace with inflation.22 This
provision is presumably revocable, and thus no more significant
than prior ad hoc increases which normally exceeded the rise in
the cost of living.3 Yet by its very existence the escalator clause
gives citizens additional practical encouragement to plan for re-
tirement in expectation of Social Security benefits undiminished
by price increases.
In the late 'forties, the Truman Administration fought and lost
a battle to add compulsory health insurance to the Social Secu-
rity program.2 4 Meanwhile, the Social Security trust fund grew,
because the actuarial assumptions of the program's draftsmen
proved conservative.25 When it became clear in 1953 that the
Eisenhower Administration would not seek to abolish Social Se-
provide a mechanism whereby the individual could prevent dependency through his
own efforts." Brown, The American Philosophy of Social Insurance, 30 Soc. SERV.
REV. I, 3 (1956).
10 The statute reserves to Congress "[the right to alter, amend, or repeal any
provision. . . " 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (,970). This reservation of power underlay the
Supreme Court's decision in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (ig6o), which held
that Congress violated no constitutional requirement when it changed the Social
Security law to deny benefits to a person deported for having been a member of
the Communist Party, even though the person belonged to the Party and paid
Social Security taxes when there was no such provision.
20 Many private pension plans are integrated with Social Security. Contributions
and payments drop as Social Security taxes and benefits increase. See, e.g., RETIRE-
MENT INCOME PLAN FOR HoURLY EMPLOYEES OF HARvARD UNIVERSITY 6-8, 12
(X975). For evidence that retirement saving is substantially less than it would be
without Social Security, see Feldstein, Social Security, Induced Retirement, and
Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 82 J. PoL. EcoN. 905 (1974).
" See, e.g., Gambill v. Finch, 3o9 F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D. Tenn. i97o) (discussing
the few technical amendments that have reduced coverage).
2242 U.S.C. § 4X5 (Supp. III, 1973). Actually, Social Security benefits now
respond both to wage increases (part of which are merely inflation) and again to
inflationary changes specifically. This "double indexing" will before very long
force gigantic tax increases, and a major transfer of income from workers to re-
tirees. Methods for correcting what is probably a legislative error are discussed
in the REPORT OF THE QuADRENNIAL ADvISORY CouNcm. ON SOcIAL SEcuaTy, H. R.
Doc. 94-75, 94th Cong., ist Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COUlicIL
REPORT]. See also Feldstein, Toward a Reform of Social Security, 40 THE PuB.
INTEREST 75 (1975).
2 See N.Y. Times, April 8, 2973, § 6, at 86, col. 6; id., Sept. 7, 1973, at 44, col. i.
24 See 2 H. TRUMAN, MEmOIRs: YEARS Or TRIAL AND HOPE 27-30 (956).
25 1953 HEW ANN. REP. 29.
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curity,26 residual demand for health insurance and the assurance
of trust fund solvency generated proposals for Social Security
protection against income loss due to serious medical disability.
The first success was 1954 legislation preserving the Social Secu-
rity work record of disabled persons: individuals who became
disabled were made eligible for retirement benefits at 65 as if
they ,had continued to work between the onset of the disability
and age 65.27 In 1956, Congress provided that Social Security tax-
payers between 5o and 65 years of age who became permanently
and totally disabled should be eligible for monthly benefits as if
they were already 65 and retired. 8 In i96o, the age-so require-
ment was removed. 9 Disability insurance payments, thus an-
nexed to the Old Age and Survivors program, are conditioned on
three important findings. A claimant is required to show (i) that
he has worked at covered employment for the, requisite number
of quarters; (2) that his inability to work is "medical" in na-
ture; and (3) that he is totally disabled. An examination of these
eligibility requirements illuminates basic questions about the ap-
propriate scope of the Social Security disability program.
A. The Prior Work Requirement
By requiring that a disability insurance recipient have worked
at covered employment for a specified number of quarters, 0 the
Social Security disability program imposes a test that, at first
glance, seems to measure a claimant's willingness to work for a
living. Such a view is superficial, for it fails to explain why one
who has achieved a place in the economic structure and is then
"
6 See A. ALTMEYER, supra note 9, at 227-28.
" Social Security Amendments of 1954, ch. 12o6, § io6(d), 68 Stat. Io8o. The
so-called "disability freeze" is still part of the law, see 42 U.S.C. § 4 16(i) (970),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 4 6(i) (Supp. III, i973), and most disability cases con-
cern claims both for current disability payments and for disability freeze pro-
tection against later reduction of retirement benefits because of the period out of
work.
2" Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, § 223, 70 Stat. 8x5.
21 Social Security Amendments of ig6o, Pub. L. No. 86-778, tit. IV, § 401, 74
Stat. 967. A claimant must have worked for 20 of the prior 4o quarters. If the
disability occurs before age 31, the claimant must have worked during half of
the quarters since his 2ist birthday, but in no event less than 6 quarters. 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(c)(I)(B) (Supp. III, 1973).
'042 U.S.C. § 423 (c) (i)(B) (Supp. III, 1973). Actually, widows and widow-
ers can receive disability benefits based on their spouse's Social Security tax pay-
ments after age 5o, even if they have not worked. Id. § 402(e)(I)(B)(i) (ig7o).
Children of qualified workers are also covered if they become permanently dis-
abled before age 18. Id. § 402(d)(i)(G) (Supp. III, i973). Social Security dis-
ability thus covers some persons who may not have "declined" from a level of
labor-force participation. These ancillary provisions raise issues much like those
now arising under SSI disability, discussed at pp. 855-67 infra.
(Vol. 89:833
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medically incapacitated deserves income support more than one
who is born medically unable to obtain an economic place. The
person born disabled could be just as willing to work, but.he will
never be eligible for Social Security disability benefits. Disabil-
ity is simply bad luck, yet our system accords better treatment
to those who are unlucky later in life than to those who were
never lucky.
A first step toward a consistent explanation of the prior work
requirement is to note its relation to the insurance aspect of So-
cial Security. The requirement ensures that the claimant has
paid the Social Security tax for a significant period. Thus bene-
fits can be characterized not as public charity but as a return of
insurance proceeds to the disability claimant who has paid tax
"premiums" to purchase protection against the risk of disability.
The insurance concept is not an entirely satisfactory explana-
tion for the prior work requirement, however, for it could as
easily justify coverage for all those now excluded by the require-
ment. We could assume that all persons undertake to pay insur-
ance premiums if and when they work, and that the promise to
pay these premiums is consideration for an insurance contract by
which society agrees to protect against the possibility that an
individual will become disabled after working and paying taxes,
or be disabled throughout his life and so never achieve a status
of taxpaying productivity. That this societal insurance concept
has not been adopted indicates that we may be unwilling to regard
as insurance a scheme that does not require a connection between
an individual's actual contributions and the benefits he will re-
ceive.
A second possible reason for the prior work requirement could
be a desire to protect the fisc against worker temptations to indo-
lence. No empirical data support the conclusion that one who has
worked will be less likely than one who has not worked to prefer
a disability pension to a job.31 Such a proposition is not implausi--
ble, however, and is the sort of collective hunch on the basis of
which social welfare decisions are often made.
A third explanation of the prior work requirement would be to
see it as embodying a judgment that the person who has worked
before becoming disabled has a stronger claim to benefits than
the person who has not worked at all. This belief could not be
based solely on the sad accident of the disabling event, which
31 Results of the New Jersey negative income tax experiment can be read as
mildly relevant data to the contrary. For example, the measured "willingness to
work" seemed to vary very little according to a person's income level or prior work
experience. See WORK INCENTivEs AND INCOME GUARANTEES (J. Pechman & P.
Timpane ed. 1975). See also L. GOODWIN/, Do THE POOR WANT TO WORK? (1972).
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would evoke equal sympathy regardless of timing; but it could
be grounded on the notion that personal expectations and reli-
ances are established with one's place in the workforce, and that
it is significantly more disturbing to be struck from one's station
than to be prevented from ever reaching it.32 Such a view would
be based on the assertion that even if an individual has claims
against society that are good despite his inability to make an eco-
nomic contribution, as he begins to contribute he not only adds to
his basic claim but also establishes a claim greater than the extent
of his contributions - a claim, for example, to be protected if
medical events outside his control make further contributions
impossible.
No single theory can fully explain the prior work requirement.
Given the payroll tax method of financing Social Security, the
prior work requirement undoubtedly is linked to the insurance
aspects of the program: part of total worker compensation is
set aside to protect those who become disabled. The require-
ment is also related to work disincentive fears: an individual who
satisfies the requirement has proved his willingness to labor. And
the requirement accords special significance to the economic ex-
pectations generated when an individual holds a job for a sub-
stantial period of time. But at base the concept of desert implicit
in the prior work requirement is the idea that in our society, al-
though one's place is not fixed at birth or even upon completion
of formal education, there should be a point at which one's sta-
tion is relatively fixed - or fixed against certain unpleasant even-
tualities - and that a specified period of workforce participation
ought to be the fixing point.3 3
B. The Requirement of "Medical" Disability
A claimant who meets the prior work requirement satisfies a
basic condition imposed on all Social Security recipients: sub-
stantial workforce participation. To qualify for disability in-
surance benefits, the claimant must also demonstrate that his
inability to obtain work is a result of "medically determinable"
illness or injury.3" The medical disability requirement means
that workers are not insured against unemployment caused by
declines in capacity or willingness to work that cannot be given
a medical explanation. For example, one person becomes lazy
2 Cf. Chatman v. Barnes, 357 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Okla. 1973) (state denied dis-
ability benefits to children if parents' income exceeded a specified level, but paid
benefits to disabled adults whose own parents exceeded the same income limits).
" See generally L. IAINWATER, WHAT MONEY BUYS (974); C. JENCKS, IN-
EQUALITY (972).
3442 U.S.C. § 423(d)(i)(A) (i97o).
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and unreliable; another ages prematurely; a third becomes surly,
and can no longer perform tasks that require cooperation with
fellow workers or with the public; a fourth begins to drink heav-
ily. The question thus presents itself: Why do we feel that medi-
cal disability provides a more compelling occasion for income
protection than changes in individual capacity to work, when
both events have the effect of ending the opportunity to earn?
The medical disability requirement obviously expresses some
special solicitude for the sick. But this concern may only reflect
the feeling that those who are "sick" have suffered an involuntary
decline in working capacity. From this perspective, the medical
disability requirement becomes an attempt to draw a line between
voluntary and involuntary unemployment. We are prepared to
support an individual whose workforce participation terminates
after even minimal achievements, but only on the theory-
which the prior work requirement itself reflects - that disability
benefits replace income which the worker expected to receive
from his job, and are not an alternative to work. Thus the medi-
cal disability requirement enforces an iron logic: those who can
work must work.
Courts reflect a determination to disqualify those who volun-
tarily withdraw from the workforce when they employ language
that speaks of intention and control in defining "medical" dis-
ability." If the individual chose the affliction, they seem to say,
he should be denied benefits. The courts are uncomfortable with
this simplistic distinction between self-induced tribulations and
catastrophic external events. 6 Judges know this is an age of
more complex theories of psychic causation. In addition, this
version of the "medical" test does not explain how much time
must have passed since the individual's choice before the conse-
" See, e.g., Osborne v. Cohen, 409 F.2d 37, 39 (6th Cir. i969). Compare Marion
v. Gardner, 359 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1966) (Blackmun, J.) (awarding disability in-
surance benefits where claimant, a homosexual, was hospitalized for mental illness
coupled with lack of power to control his sexual impulses), with Pierce v. Gardner,
388 F.2d 846, 848 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 885 (1968) (denying bene-
fits because "the record discloses no mental illness but only a mental or per-
sonality disorder coupled with a propensity (not uncontrolled impulse) to the com-
mission of sex offenses").
36 A typical case is Judge Dooling's attempt to determine whether a claimant
exhibited "voluntary resignation to alcoholism as an escape of choice from a life of
daily labor" or, on the other hand, "helpless self-entrapment in an unconquerable
addiction," Badichek v. Secretary of HEW, 374 F. Supp. 94o, 942-43 (E.D.N.Y.
1974). Compare A. MH.NE, THE WORLD OF POOH 208 (1957):
"Can they fly?" asked Roo.
"Yes," said Tigger. "They're very good flyers, Tiggers are. Stornry good
flyers."
"Ooo !" said Roo. "Can they fly as well as Owl?"
"Yes," said Tigger. "Only they don't want to."
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quences will be regarded as a qualifying disability. For instance,
an individual may have "chosen" to begin drinking years ago,
but may have become a "medically determinable" alcoholic who
today cannot easily free himself from addiction. 7 But despite
its simplicity and its shortcomings, the "medical" label still serves
as a very rough line excluding from qualification those changes
in employment status that, have resulted from the individual's
own choices and therefore not from a random external event.
The central difficulty with the medical disability requirement
has been that persons with indistinguishable physical ailments
report differing degrees of physical limitation or pain, and differ
as well in the extent to which they modify their behavior.3 8 The
variety of individual reactions to illness and injury presents the
Social Security Administration with a large number of difficult
qualification questions.3 9 The SSA often concludes that an indi-
vidual is not medically disabled because for many other persons
a similar injury or illness is compatible with work. 0 A substan-
tial percentage of these administrative determinations are in turn
reversed by the courts,4 which have pronounced no general
" See, e.g., Wheeler v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 513 S.W.2d 179 (Tenn. 1974)
(workman's compensation case). But cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 55o (x968)
(White, J., concurring in result):
I cannot say that the chronic alcoholic who proves his disease and a
compulsion to drink is shielded from conviction when he has knowingly
failed to take feasible precautions against committing a criminal act, here the
act of going to or remaining in a public place.
"
8 E.g., Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 1964) ("While the medical
evidence may perhaps indicate that Mrs. Ber's physical symptoms were of a type
which probably would have caused many people considerably less pain than Mrs.
Ber suffered, it nevertheless amply supports her complaint that in her particular
medical case these symptoms were accompained by pain so very real to her and
so intense as to disable her.") ; Page v. Celebrezze, 311 F.2d 757, 762-63 (5th Cir.
1963).
" See Dixon, The Welfare State and Mass Justice: A Warning from the Social
Security Disability Program, 1972 Duxa, L.J. 681, 683 n.i2. The difficulty of these
individualized determinations was apparent to one perceptive commentator when
the initial "disability freeze" law was enacted. See E. BURNs, SOCIAL SECURITY AND
PUBLIC POLICY 224 (2956). It is not apparent even now to the Supreme Court. See
Mathews v. Eldridge, 55 U.S.L.W. 4224, 4232 (U.S. Feb. 24, I976) (Powell, J.):
In short, a medical assessment of the worker's physical or mental condition
is required. This is a more sharply focused and easily documented decision
than the typical determination of welfare entitlement. In the latter case, a
wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, and issues of witness
credibility and veracity often are critical to the decisionmaking process ...
By contrast, the decision whether to discontinue disability benefits will
turn, in most cases, upon "routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports
by physician specialists" . .40 See, e.g., Hayes v. Celebrezze, 311 F.2d 648, 65z (5th Cir. 2963) ("The Sec-
retary persists in the notion that no matter how painful in fact [claimant's
osteoarthritis of the spine] must be, it does not satisfy the statute.").
41 In 197x there were 1537 new disability complaints in the district courts and
226o "old" disability cases awaiting disposition. In that year the courts of appeals
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rules for qualification but have instead employed the technique
of finding the Secretary's evidence insufficient to support a con-
clusion of nonmedical disability. 2
The high reversal rate could be attributed to a difference in
institutional perspectives. The Secretary runs a large program,
and must have rules. Attempting to implement Congress' clear
purpose that benefits be provided only to those persons in fact
medically disabled, the Secretary establishes hurdles that make
it difficult for someone to qualify solely on the basis of a persis-
tent assertion that he is physically incapable of work or able to
work only with great pain.43 Judges, on the other hand, need not
consider the program as a whole or its annual budget. Their in-
quiry is normally focused on an individual claimant, whose story
is often sympathetic, whose perseverence in carrying the case so
far is evidence of a sincere claim, and who will not be on Easy
Street even if he wins the appeal.4
decided 86 disability cases, and had 69 others pending. The Secretary was affirmed
in only 627 of the 1971 district court cases. From inception of the disability pro-
gram through calendar 1970, the Secretary's record in the courts of appeals was
232 affirmances and 162 reversals and remands. Dixon, supra note 39, at 7oo-oi
& nn.92 & 93. See also Sayers v. Gardner, 38o F.2d 940, 942-43 (6th Cir. 1967) ;
L. JAFTE, JuDIcIAL CONTROL OF AD miSTRATiva ACTION 6o8 (T965); Kaufman,
District Court Review of Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Decisions,
26 AD. L. REV. 113 (1974). The high reversal rate for disability cases has been
cited both to show that the appellate system is fair, Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 410 (1971) (Blackmun, J.), and to show that the initial process is dubious,
Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 2o8, 221 (,972) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
Brudno, Fairness and Bureaucracy: The Demise of Procedural Due Process for
Welfare Claimants, 25 HAsTINGs LJ. 813, 826 n.4I (i974).
"
2 An example is Wilson v. Richardson, 455 F.2d 304 (4 th Cir. 1972), where
the Secretary applied his crude rule-earnings of $140 per month show an. in-
dividual is not disabled, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.I534(b) (1975) -even though the
claimant had held and lost eleven different jobs because employers discovered his
impairments or because of the strain on his back and legs. The court reversed,
saying that sometimes a record of employment can establish, instead of refute, a
conclusion of disability. Similar cases include Dodsworth v. Celebrezze, 349 F.2d
312 (5th Cir. 1965); Mefford v. Gardner, 383 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1967); Browne
v. Richardson, 468 F.2d IOO3 (ist Cir. 1972); Webb v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp.
793 (N.D. Ind. I974). These cases exhibit a modem view of how much pain and
discomfort an individual must bear that is quite different from the sturdy attitude
of judge Learned Hand:
A man may have to endure discomfort or pain and not be totally disabled;
much of the best work of life goes on under such disabilities; if the insurance
had been against suffering, it would have read so.
Theberge v. United States, 87 F.2d 697, 698 (2d Cir. 1937) (plaintiff's claim for
benefits under war risk insurance policy should not reach jury).
"' See, e.g., Butler v. Flemming, 288 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. i96i) ("[cllaimant could
no longer even shuffle dominoes," yet Secretary denied benefits).
"' Reversals seem to be a complex of (i) the inherently amorphous nature
of the abstract capacity-for-gainful-activity standard when applied to claim-
ants with some quantum of residual work capacity; (2) the borderline fact
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The conflict between the Secretary and the courts on the medi-
cal disability issue exposes a broader disagreement about
the nature and purpose of the Social Security program. The
Secretary's Procrustean rules achieve a certain sort of fairness by
regularizing discretionary determinations. From his perspective,
if most persons will respond in a certain way to a particular in-
jury or illness, then it is appropriate to assume that everyone will
respond in that way. The courts have taken a contrary position
that is more responsive to the insurance aspects of Social Secu-
rity. Their insistence that the Secretary produce better evidence
to rebut individual disability claims can be seen as a determina-
tion to interpret the program's content with attention to the ex-
pectations individuals have formed as they have participated in
an on-going relationship with the United States. Relying on
the government's promise of disability benefits, citizens have
forsaken alternative savings arrangements." The individual
worker believes he is protected against medical catastrophe. To
him that means he will receive income-support payments if he
is sick or hurt and can no longer work. He certainly does not
expect that an injury which disables him will be found noncom-
pensable (i.e., nonmedical) because most persons would be able
to continue working with symptoms that are indistinguishable to
the doctors' methods and machines.
The courts' concern for individual worker expectations is fully
consistent with the history and conduct of the Social Security
disability insurance program. When a judge reverses a denial of
benefits, he should be seen as saying that the program's purpose
is to assure income related to prior earnings when a claimant can
make a sufficient showing of certain sorts of random bad luck,
and that the showing made by the claimant is sufficient, in that
most persons (i) would want to be covered if they could make
such a showing; (2) would expect a disability insurance program
to cover them in such circumstances; and (3) are prepared to
situations in most of the cases which fall outside [per se rules]; (3) the
difficulty in assessing psychological overlay in the borderline cases; (4) the
conclusory testimony of some medical advisers, which has telling effects; (5)
the naturally appealing nature of the face-to-face contact, which first occurs
at the hearing examiner level; (6) the presence of an attorney who in any
borderline case can always make a plausible argument, and by his mere
presence threatens further appeal; (7) the natural desire of an appellate
body to exercise its independence, which in the SSA context can only be ac-
complished through ruling in favor of the claimant; (8) at the court level,
judicial ignorance or simply nonacceptance of the statutory standard of
disability.
Dixon, supra note 39, at 732-33 n.259. Of course, one thing the history of public
disability insurance may show is that there are some legislative distinctions that,
even if they accurately describe the categories popular perceptions would define,
are extremely hard to administer cheaply and fairly.
45 See pp. 838-39 & nn.I8-2o supra.
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pay the costs of coverage for all such cases as are likely to arise.
This focus on the reasonable expectations of Social Security par-
ticipants suggests the need for fact-finding procedures open to
allegations of pain; 46 to assertions that a physical accident has
led to changes in personality so drastic as to prevent effective
work;47 and to claims that an individual is disabled even if he
declines a dangerous and frequently unsuccessful operation.4" The
central characteristics of Social Security disability insurance
should be a claimant's climb to a place in the labor force, his
loss of that place due to one of a category of external risks we
have decided to spread among all workers, and his current inabil-
ity to achieve income without a degree of effort or suffering that
persons generally would regard as unnecessary for someone with
this individual's thresholds of pain and discomfort.49 These are
exceedingly individualized determinations, to be sure, but they
are necessary if this program is to perform its appropriate task.
C. The Total Disability Requirement
Even if a claimant has worked for the required number of
quarters and has suffered a "medical" decline, benefits will be
denied unless the fall from employability is total." For example,
a skilled auto mechanic whose rheumatism makes him unable to
repair cars but who is still capable of performing a sedentary
occupation is not covered. The statute does not insure against
his decline in income,51 nor does it offer him the option of sub-
46 See Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. r964).
47 See Davidson v. Gardner, 370 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1967).
4" See Morse v. Gardner, 272 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. La. 1967).
40 Emphasizing this explanation for the Social Security disability program
casts doubt on one group of cases in which the judges have been moved to over-
rule administrative denials of benefits. Sometimes, an individual is physically or
mentally impaired from the beginning of his working life, but manages to ac-
cumulate the very brief work experience (theoretically, as little as $300 in covered
wages, over a period of eighteen months, see note ri supra) required for Social
Security coverage. If this person then applies for benefits, but cannot show that
his condition has deteriorated, the theory of the program advanced above would
suggest denial. Courts usually look only at the condition of the person as he appears
before them, and at the technical requirements for achieving coverage. If the
person now seems impaired, they are likely to reverse a denial of benefits even if
the person was no healthier when working. See, e.g., Rayborn v. Weinberger, 398
F. Supp. 1303 (N.D. Ind. 31975).
5042 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2) (A) (,970).
" But see Hearings Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 93d Cong.,
ist Sess., pt. 4, at 246 (1973) (suggestion by former HEW Secretary Cohen that




sisting on a disability grant or taking a lower paying job."2 Be-
cause the claimant can work, he must work.
Although the Social Security statute defines total disability as
"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment," ''
some workers are classified as totally disabled with no inquiry
into whether they can work at other jobs. Loss of both arms or
both legs, for example, is a per se case of total disability accord-
ing to the Secretary's regulations. 4 But unless a claimant is un-
lucky enough to have lost a large chunk of his anatomy, he can
qualify only by showing that, in his specific case, a medical im-
pairment has brought him within the statutory standard of
inability to perform "substantial gainful activity."
i. Reasons for the Total Disability Requirement. - Two ideas
compete for priority in the Social Security program. One is need.
Because one of the program's purposes is to prevent destitution,
it inevitably strains to conserve limited resources for allocation
among the most needy. This concern for prudence not only man-
dates efficient identification of the most needy. It also mandates
equity: an inquiry into the relative claims of possible recipients.
The second concept is insurance. The government's representa-
tions have generated expectations and reliances by working per-
sons, and the program must redeem its promises so that its
ongoing commitments will be credible. The total disability re-
quirement shows the complex interplay of these two concepts in
a program plainly attempting to respond to both of them.
The total disability requirement certainly implements an in-
tention to allocate limited resources to the most needy. Those
who cannot work need more assistance than those able to obtain
a job, even though it pays less than their former employment.
Denial of benefits for partial disabilities also conserves resources
by avoiding the substantial cost of ascertaining the precise extent
of a partial disability. But efficiency is always with us, providing
a reason for doing less rather than more. And Social Security is
not the only potential source of support for the completely dis-
2 But cf. Stewart v. Cohen, 309 F. Supp. 949, 955 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (suggesting
that college-educated claimant might be permitted to receive benefits during a lim-
ited period of rehabilitation and training, instead of being required to accept
employment as unskilled laborer, so he could again be qualified for white-collar
employment).
" U.S.C. § 423(d) (I) (A) (197o).
1 
4 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(c) (I975); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEW, So-
cmAL SECURITY ADmINIsTRATioN, DISABILITY AND SOCIAL SECURITY (1965). Qualify-
ing injuries and illnesses are listed in 20 C.F.R. ch. III, subpt. P, app. (1975). For
evidence that Congress has approved qualification on the basis of such "pure"
medical determinations, see Dixon, supra note 39, at 704 n.iio.
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abled. Other programs - such as general relief or AFDC -
identify their beneficiaries principally in terms of need. There-
fore, neither administrative efficiency nor an attempt to assist the
most needy can fully explain (i) why Social Security disability
denies benefits to those only partially disabled, or (2) why we
pay those who are totally disabled with relatively generous Social
Security checks rather than with AFDC or general relief grants.
A totally disabled person who has never worked, or a person
whose alleged total disability is not medically cognizable, may
be just as needy as a Social Security disability recipient- yet
we tell him to look elsewhere for income protection. 55
It is tempting to see the total disability requirement as an ex-
emplification of a principle of equity. In our economy, some
individuals must perform disagreeable and low-paid jobs. Since a
partially disabled person can by definition perform at least this
sort of job, it may be thought to be inequitable to treat him as
having a claim on society greater than that of a person who has
always worked at a lesser-paying job. Thus, if we focus only on
need, it may seem unreasonable to differentiate between similarly
situated persons merely because one has suffered a partial medical
disability.
The difficulty with this argument from equity is that we pay
benefits to those "totally" disabled for a medical reason who have
satisfied the prior work requirement, but not to persons unable to
work who have never worked or whose difficulty is not "medi-
cal." The very existence of the Social Security disability program
is an assertion that the person whose employment history shows
a medical decline from earlier achievement deserves benefits
more generous and less burdened by bureaucratic indignities
than the person who has not previously worked. The disabled
person has been encouraged to think of the Social Security taxes
deducted from his wages as a purchase of insurance against in-
come loss from medical catastrophe. That the disabled claimant
is no worse off than some who clearly have no Social Security
claim is irrelevant: it is prior work and medical catastrophe, not
level of need, on which the disabled person urges his right to
Social Security. Because Social Security has such a substantial
insurance component - responding to an individual's personal
work record, to the expectations created by employment, and to
" See Coleman v. Gardner, 264 F. Supp. 714, 718 (S.D.W. Va. 1967):
In this instance, plaintiff's youth and sketchy work record mitigate [sic]
against his claim. The Act's disability benefit provisions are designed pri-
marily to aid workers who, after having made a contribution to the nation's
work force, are unable to continue. It is not intended, nor should we allow
it to become, a substitute for the various Federal and State direct relief pro-
grams for the socially deprived.
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the particular causes of his present difficulties - arguments based
solely on equitable treatment of those currently in similar eco-
nomic circumstances cannot fully explain the program's basic
rules or provide sufficient guidance in resolving the ambiguities
of the statute.
Thus no logic requires that the Social Security program deny
protection against partial declines in earning power. The pro-
gram excludes these declines because funds are limited and be-
cause the exclusion avoids a category of difficult administrative
determinations. Denying benefits for partial disability is accept-
able, however, because official messages have always made clear
that only "total" disability will be compensated.
2. The Job Gap Cases. - The tension, implicit in Social Se-
curity, between providing income support for an equitably
defined subgroup of the needy and satisfying the officially encour-
aged expectations of wage-earners, is best illustrated in the "job
gap" cases. An individual enters the job gap when he suffers an
unquestioned medical disability that prevents continuation of
pre-injury employment, when he remains physically and emotion-
ally able to do certain other jobs, but when he cannot obtain
another job. Jobs may be unavailable because: (i) they do not
exist where the claimant lives;5 6 (2) employers incorrectly con-
clude that the disability prevents performance of the job; " or
(3) employers hire non-disabled persons who are younger, or
abler, or safer risks.58 Such a worker is medically disabled; the
disability is a but-for cause of his unemployment; and yet his
disability alone does not keep him from working. It is disability
as well as labor market conditions that have left him unemployed.
The first extended analysis of the job gap problem appeared
in the influential case of Kerner v. Flemming.59 Kerner had been a
self-employed furniture repairman. After suffering a heart attack
and serious diabetes, he could only do "light, sedentary work.""0
His willingness to do such work was unquestioned. To the extent
jobs were available, however, employers chose not hire a 6o-year-
old diabetic with a history of heart disease. The Secretary denied
benefits, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed. Judge Friendly interpreted the disability requirement as
follows: "What can applicant do, and what employment oppor-
tunities are there for a man who can do only what applicant can
5 6 E.g., Wright v. Gardner, 403 F.2d 646 (Tth Cir. i968).
" See, e.g., King v. Gardner, 391 F.2d 401, 404-05 n.7 (5th Cir.) (dictum),
vacated on rehearing, 391 F.2d 401, 410-IX (Sth Cir. 1967) (en banc).
58 E.g., Caraballo v. Secretary, 346 F. Supp. 93 (D.P.R. 1972).
59 283 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. ig6o) (Friendly, J.).60 Id. at 9,8.
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do.'61 Kerner gradually received wide,62 though not universal, 3
assent. Courts placed on the Secretary the burden - once a
claimant showed a disability making him unfit for his former
work --of producing evidence sufficient to show not only what
work the claimant was still capable of performing, but also that
obtaining such work was a realistic possibility, and realistic near
the claimant's home.64
Only Judge Wisdom, in a perceptive dissent from Fifth Cir-
cuit agreement with Kerner,6 5 recognized the potential applica-
tion to job gap cases of a principle of equity that would justify
exclusion from the program of those who are only partially dis-
abled. He acknowledged the economic distress of medically im-
paired persons in the job gap, but contended that it was not dis-
tinguishable from the need of every non-disabled person in the
job gap. Non-disabled persons who cannot find work, Judge
Wisdom argued, must rely on unemployment insurance or, when
that expires, on general public assistance, and he found neither
equitable nor statutory authority for treating medically impaired
persons any differently. 66
61 283 F.2d at 921. Kerner himself apparently did not benefit from his doctrinal
victory. See Kerner v. Celebrezze, 340 F.2d 736 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
861 (i965).
'2 See, e.g., Baker v. Gardner, 362 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1966) ; McMuller v. Cele-
breeze, 335 F.2d 8ix (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 854 (1965); Torres v.
Celebrezze, 349 F.2d 342 (ist Cir. I965).
0" See, e.g., Loftis v. Ribicoff, 193 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Mo. i96r).
64 An extreme version of the Kerner issue was presented in Sayers v. Gardner,
380 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1967). There, claimant could not get jobs because em-
ployers said they would have an "insurance problem" if they hired her, and the
court reversed the Secretary's conclusion that claimant could in fact work.
Obviously, the Secretary was making one decision (whether claimant could or
could not work), the employer was making a second (whether, among the can-
didates for some particular job, he and his workmen's compensation carrier pre-
ferred someone who had not previously been sick), and the court was making a
third decision (whether a reasonable disability statute would regard this individual's
reasons for being unemployed as "medical"). For an example of a decision, re-
flecting an appreciation of actual labor market conditions, see Hanes v. Celebreeze,
337 F.2d 209 (4 th Cir. 3964). The claimant had a patronage job as custodian at a
public building, but the court rejected the Secretary's conclusion that performing
that job- which in fact his wife and son often performed for him -showed that
he was not disabled. Accord, Stark v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 1092 (Tth Cir. 1974)
(Stevens, J.).
05 King v. Gardner, 391 F.2d 401, 405 (5 th Cir. x967) (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
Even though judge Wisdom failed to persuade the majority to deny benefits
to King, her victory was Pyrrhic. She was ultimately denied benefits when-
while her case was still being litigated - Congress adopted Judge Wisdom's position
in the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act, see p. 853 infra. See King v.
Finch, 428 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970).
"Perhaps surprisingly, the commentators generally sided with Judge Wisdom.
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But Judge Wisdom's position does not differentiate among the
needy, or among the programs we have established to assist them.
Because he considered Social Security disability benefits to be
no more than a general relief dole, and to be unaffected by the
program's insurance image and its role in framing worker expec-
tations, Judge Wisdom saw no inconsistency in asking why a
worker cannot get a job now without inquiring as to why he lost
the job he had. No doubt Congress did not mean to pay disability
benefits to a worker who loses his job because of automation or
a demand contraction: the medical disability requirement is
proof of that. Yet in arguing against Kerner, Judge Wisdom ig-
nored the fact that except for a medical misfortune, the job gap
claimant would have been working. Furthermore, Judge Wisdom's
position proves too much. It is, of course, based on the assump-
tion that Mr. Kerner can work, but virtually every disabled per-
son can do something for which another person will pay. He is
"totally" disabled because the market value of his labor, given
such alternatives as machines and healthy persons, is so low. In-
deed, disability is as much a function of social choices as it is a
result of illness or injury. We impose - arbitrarily, but sympa-
thetically and wisely -a barrier that says, "Work less valuable
than this price shall not be done for money in this society. If that
is all you can do, it is better that you be regarded as unemployed
or disabled." Thus, Mr. Kerner could not work, and since his re-
moval from the workforce was occasioned by medical disability,
he should have received benefits."
This sense of disability as society's categorization of those
honorably disqualified from work is adumbrated in the pain and
suffering cases, which the system normally deals with under the
rubric of the medical disability requirement,68 but which reflect
an implicit judgment about total disability. The claimant alleges
that a certain injury is so painful that he cannot perform any work.
See, e.g., Rowland, Judicial Review of Disability Determinations, 52 GEo. L.J.
42, 79 (1963); Note, Social Security Diability Determinations: The Burden of
Proof on Appeal, 63 MICHr. L. REV. 1465, 1472-73 (x965).
6" Recognition of the attitude suggested above can be seen in the so-called
"wolf from the door" cases. Occasionally under Social Security disability, courts
have disagreed with the Secretary's conclusion that an individual's earnings history
demonstrates that he is not disabled. The judges have said that the need to eat
will force some individuals to work even though they qualify as disabled. The
conclusion must be that the physical capacity to do work for which the market
will pay does not establish the absence of a disability, but that at least sometimes
a judgment independent of the market's can be made that the person need not
work. See, e.g., Flemming v. Booker, 283 F.2d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 296o); Hanes v.
Celebreeze, 337 F.2d 209, 213-14 (4th Cir. 1964); cf. United States v. Spaulding,
293 U.S. 498, 5o5 (i935) (World War I risk policy).6 8 See pp. 842-45 supra.
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The Secretary concludes that, because similar injuries have not
completely disabled other workers, inability to work is caused by
a failure of will, and hence he labels the disability as nonmedical.
When courts review those cases, their opinions express a social
judgment as to whether that level of pain is a sufficient reason to
quit work altogether.
The obvious rightness of the Secretary's per se rules for total
disability- automatic qualification for a person who has lost
both arms, for example 69 also suggests that our definition of
disability incorporates common expectations and shared values
about what infirmities a person ought not to have to bear and keep
working. As to persons so disabled, we say, in essence, "No one
expects you to work any longer. If this happens to you, you can
stop work and receive Social Security benefits."
3. The Job Gap Statute.- The Kerner debate was possible
because the job gap question was left open by the Social Security
statute. Once a judicial consensus developed, of course, Congress
might have left that consensus undisturbed. Instead, it overruled
the judges who followed Kerner. In 1967 disability insurance
was amended to provide that an impairment could not be con-
sidered a "total" disability unless it rendered the claimant unable
to perform not only his previous work, but also "any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy,
regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in
which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him,
or whether he would be hired if he applied for work." 70
In its Report accompanying the legislation, the House Ways
and Means Committee expressed "concern about the rising cost
of the disability insurance program and the way the definition of
'disability' has been interpreted." "' Cost may have been a factor
in the legislative calculus, although what was at stake was a tiny
part of the entire Social Security program. Rather, at least some
legislators must have felt disserved by what the Senate Finance
Committee referred to as "some of the court decisions on the sub-
ject." 72 The betrayal presumably was accomplished by judicial
admission to "disabled" status of individuals with inferior claims,
who might just be malingering, or whose need for money - even
09 See p. 848 & n.54 supra.
70 Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 158(d) (2) (A), 8i
Stat. 868 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (2) (A) (1970)).
71 H.R. REP. No. 544, goth Cong., ist Sess. 28 (1967). The Senate defeated the
anti-Kerner legislation, 113 CONG. REc. 16,746 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1967), but then
accepted the Conference Committee's restoration of it, 113 CoNG. REc. 35,924 (daily
ed. Dec. iS, 1967).7 2 See S. REP. No. 744, goth Cong., 1st Sess. 47-49 (1967).
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if real - ought not to be met with checks carrying the very special
dignity associated with Social Security.
4. Disappointed Expectations. - It is, of course, possible to
maintain Judge Wisdom's distinction between Kerner and the
person so sick that he cannot physically perform any job that pays
the minimum wage, and possible, too, to regard Kerner as no dif-
ferent from unemployed persons whose abilities have not declined.
But in light of the concepts underlying Social Security and its
disability component, Kerner and its progeny ought not to have
been disapproved.73 The Social Security disability program ex-
presses not only a present willingness to support the incomes of
certain needy people. It is a complex interrelated scheme, clearly
intended (i) to reassure workers who fear the economic conse-
quences of disability; (2) to enforce prudence by taxing their
labor as a means of financing protection; and (3) to pay benefits
as a matter of right. Social Security disability may not be a private
insurance contract, but it obviously reflects a congressional pur-
pose to create expectations and behavior exceedingly similar to
what would be brought about by mandatory private insurance.
To visualize Social Security disability protection as a function
of worker expectations is to see a way through the Kerner prob-
lem. If an individual bought private insurance against total medi-
cal disability and then became so sick that he could not do his
former job, would he not expect to be paid - even if he could
still perform some work but could not obtain a job? What point
would insurance have, if not to pay when sickness leads to zero
income? The insured might be less "needy" because of his theo-
retical capacity to work, but the point of the insurance would
surely be income continuation if labor could not produce cash.
We would be outraged if the small print in a Mutual of Omaha
policy denied payments to Mr. Kerner. Because the United States,
in its Social Security program, has tried to be Mutual of Omaha,
7 3 The battle over Kerner continues. The 1975 Social Security Advisory Council
adopted former HEW Secretary Cohen's suggestion that persons over 55 be eligible
for disability benefits when unable to engage in their "customary occupation," see
note 51 supra, instead of the present requirement of inability to engage in any
substantial occupation. See ADVISORY CouNcil. REPORT, supra note 22, at 38-40.
The Council's recommendation was that persons in the job gap receive 8o percent
of the benefits paid to those who now qualify as disabled. This increase in coverage
would cost the nation 0.13 percent of the total payroll subject to the Social
Security tax. The durability of the judicial preference for the Kerner result is
suggested by district court cases in which a close look at "substantial evidence"
review suggests that the judge is attempting to exhume Kerner even after its clear
legislative burial. See, e.g., Thomas v. Richardson, 371 F. Supp. 362, 363-64
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Lashbaugh v. Gardner, 294 F. Supp. 1143, IX45-46 (D. Ore.
i968). But see, e.g., Brown v. Finch, 429 F.2d 8o, 82-83 (5th Cir. 197o).
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judicial interpretation of the statutory ambiguity should mirror
adjudication of a claim against a private insurer. 71
Feelings of security, of status, and of assurance are important
ingredients of human welfare. At the core of Social Security is a
promise by the polity that a degree of labor force achievement
justifies an expectation of income security against medical dis-
ability. In the 1967 amendments, Congress casually disregarded
Mr. Kerner's reasonable expectations as a wage-earner, had he
contemplated the possibility of disabling illness, and his expecta-
tions as a sick person when he sought the benefits toward which he
thought he had contributed. It may be that the denial of benefits
for partial disability illustrates a situation where the burdens of
administration constrain the achievement of a social welfare sys-
tem whose coverage is fully appropriate to its logic. But if the
program remains focused on total disability, then it should cover
all cases in which a medical cause leads to total unemployment,
even if the claimant might be put to work by an ideal labor market.
Social Security seeks to gain for the nation the increase in welfare
incident to a broad expectation of protection. To keep that faith,
it must meet the expectations thus engendered.
II. SSI DISABILITY
Millions of people medically unfit for labor are not eligible
for Social Security disability: persons born with a disability,
disabled during childhood, or disabled as adults before achieving
sufficient experience at covered employment. From 1950 to 1972,
the states provided income support to disabled persons unable to
qualify for Social Security under one of the federally subsidized
"categorical" aid programs,75 which also included aid to the aged,
the blind, and single parents.76 In 1972, after considering the Ad-
"
4 For a case under a private insurance policy, but otherwise indistinguishable
from Kerner, see Snelson v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., 65 Ill. App. 2d 416, 212
N.E.2d 873 (195). Snelson had worked as a bricklayer until he was injured.
After the injury, doctors said there was a fair amount he could do, but he testified
that when he went to the "unemployment place," he was told they "had guys in
better shape ... and not to come back." The policy insured against "total dis-
ability and total loss of time." The court held for the claimant, saying that "when
a man is no longer able to do his accustomed task and such work as he has only
been trained to do, and upon which he must depend for a living, he is totally
disabled within the meaning of the policy in question." Id. at 429, 212 N.E.2d
at 880. See also Dixon v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 268 F.2d 812, 8x5-x6 (2d
Cir. x959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (196o) (permitting a surgeon to recover on
his private disability insurance policy when he suffered an injury to his hand that
would have permitted him to continue work only as a general practitioner).
" See Social Security Act Amendments of i95o, ch. 8og, § 351, 64 Stat. 555.
" See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3o-o6 (197o) (aged); id. §§ 6oi-io (dependent children);
id. §§ 12ox-o6 (blind).
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ministration's welfare reform proposals for two years, Congress
concluded that despite universal rhetorical castigation of the pres-
ent welfare system, there was no Senate majority for any par-
ticular alternative.7" In the pain of that awareness, Congress re-
treated to a 194-page assortment that the newspapers treated as
technical amendments to the Social Security Act. 8 Thus, little
fanfare accompanied the most important federal income-support
legislation since enactment of Social Security in i935. 79 The
amendments merged categorical aid for the aged, blind, and dis-
abled, and created a new federal program called Supplemental
Security Income (SSI). ° Congress thus separated income main-
tenance for these three groups from Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC).
In a short time, SSI became a major undertaking. Only a
year after the program's inception, benefits were being paid to
four million persons, and the President's 1976 budget projected
expenditures of 5.5 billion dollars for SSI.8 ' Qualification for SSI
benefits by virtue of age or blindness is determined by objective
standards of age or diminished sight.82 Eligibility by reason of
disability cannot be so -easily determined, however, and cases
testing the ambiguous statutory language inevitably pose difficult
questions about the extent to which the nation has committed it-
self to an assurance of minimum income.
A. The Significance of SSI Qualification
It is important to recognize at the outset that the new SSI
definition of disability is of great significance to a large number of
persons. Before SSI, qualification for Social Security disability
meant relatively generous benefits, payments as a matter of right,
" See 118 CONG. REc. x6,8o-69 (Oct. 4, 1972); id. at 16,921-17,032 (Oct. 5,
1972) ; id. at 18,495-500 (Oct. 17, 1972). For descriptions of the proposed reform
plan, see H.R. REP. No. 92-231, 92d Cong., ist Sess. (1971); S. RE'. No. 92-1230,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ; CONF. REP. No. 92-i6o5, 9 2d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
" Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329;
see, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. i8, 1972, at 48, col i.
" The only other substantial additions to the federal income-support effort
were Social Security disability, see pp. 839-40 supra, and "categorical" dis-
ability aid, see p. 855 supra. Of course poor persons receive immense financial
benefit from Medicaid, Medicare, and Food Stamps, but these programs support
only certain sorts of expenditures.
80 Social Security Amendments of X972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§ 26o-02, 86 Stat.
30X-02 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-82 (Supp. III, 1973)).
81 38 Soc. SEC. BuM. 43 (Oct. 1975); THE BuDGET FOR THE UNITED STATES
GOVRNMENT: FiscAL YEAR 1976, at 244 (1975).
82 The age qualification is 65, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a) (2) (A) (Supp. I1, 1973),
and "blindness" is defined as "central visual acuity of 20/200 or less in the
better eye with the use of a correcting lens," id. § 1382c(a) (2).
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and respectable status as a former taxpayer struck from the work-
force by medical catastrophe. Extensive litigation demonstrated
both that the statutory standard of disability was hard to apply
and that attaining the special status of a Social Security recipient
was important to many persons. At the same time, millions of
persons were receiving disability benefits from state welfare de-
partments under the categorical disability program. The states
established disability definitions that were no less ambiguous
than the federal requirements,8 3 but there was virtually no litiga-
tion. 4 The reason, presumably, was that most persons not called
"disabled" instead received AFDC or general relief assistance,
and were indifferent about which "welfare" category was the
source of their support.8 '
SSI changed that. Whether one is "disabled" or "on welfare,"
previously only a technical distinction between categorical aid
programs, is now a matter of the greatest practical, moral, and
emotional significance. This is because our social welfare pro-
grams fall along a continuum that may be crudely described as
running from legitimacy to stigma, from entitlement to gratuity.
Before 1972, disabled persons ineligible for Social Security benefits
were located with AFDC recipients at the least dignified position
on the continuum.' Now, with SSI, they have been moved toward
"
3 See, e.g., 23 ILL. R!v. STAT. § 3-I (I968) ("physical or mental impairment,
disease, or loss which is of a permanent nature and which substantially impairs . . .
ability to perform labor or to engage in useful occupation for which he is qualified").
4 One of the few pre-SSI state disability cases was Zunino v. Carleson, 33 Cal.
App. 3d 36, ioS Cal. Rptr. 769 (Ct. App. 1973).
8 Benefits were, however, usually higher under categorical disability assistance
than under AFDC. See G. STEINER, SOCIAL INSECURITY 24 (1966). In I97i, average
benefit levels for ABPTD recipients ranged from a low of $5o per month in
Alabama to a high of $177 per month in Alaska, with a national average of $98
per month. At the same time, average monthly AFDC payments ranged from
$12 in Mississippi to $78 in New York, with an average of $5o. See DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS IN THE U.S. 102-
03 (1971).
8 On the differences between Social Security disability and pre-I972 categorical
disability, see tenBroek & Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, in THE
LAW OF THE POOR 485, 494-96 (tenBroek ed. x966). Concerning the treatment of
AFDC recipients and, by analogy, categorical disability beneficiaries, see, e.g.,
J]oIT EcoNoMIC COMMITTEE, ISSUES IN WELFARE ADMINISTRATION: WELFARE-
AN ADMINISTRATIVE NIGHTmARE 26-34 (1972).
The crucial distinction between Social Security and "welfare" is appreciated
by legislators and administrators:
Senator Church. Could I just underline that point by saying that in my own
experience I have always noticed how differently people regard Social Security
and welfare. I think I have yet to find a person who thought that his Social
Security benefits were related in any way to a welfare payment. They are
thought of as matters of entitlement, and since everyone does share in them,
since they extend to all persons considered by the program, regardless of
income, there is no feeling that there is welfare in that program. It makes a
great deal of difference to so many people.
1976]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
entitlement, but their progression has stopped short of the place
occupied by Social Security recipients.
Unlike AFDC or general relief arrangements, SSI is admin-
istered by the federal Social Security Administration, 87 and cash
benefits are not conditioned on a work search or acceptance of
"improvement" services. Indeed, the government has undertaken
to seek qualified recipients; 88 and the statute and its implement-
ing regulations emphasize entitlement rather than stigma.89 Al-
though financing of SSI through general revenues 90 and the pro-
Mr. Cohen. That is why I say, Senator, one must view with very great con-
cern the recommendations by many economists to change the financing be-
cause they look at the whole mechanism as a redistribution of income. I
share their view. I am strongly for appropriate redistribution of their income
through our tax system. But I want to be very careful that we don't try to
inject into the Social Security system a redistribution philosophy that will
ruin the public opinion support that you have just expressed which the
American people have, and transform their concept of Social Security from
a right into a welfare system. That would be a terrible loss.
Senator Church. I agree with you completely.
Hearings Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 93d Cong., ist Sess., pt.
4, at 246 (1973). Welfare recipients' attitudes mirror the publicly perceived dis-
tinction. See Briar, Welfare From Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare
System, 54 CALIP. L. REv. 370, 377 (1966) ("Asked whether the social worker has
a right to know how the aid money is spent, sixty-six percent [of AFDC re-
cipients] said yes. . . . And asked whether in their opinion aid should be cut off
[if not being spent properly), seventy-six percent of the recipients said yes.").
An early and trenchant analysis of these issues was tenBroek & Wilson, Public
Assistance and Social Insurance-A Normative Evaluation, I U.C.L.A. L. REV.
237 (X954). Interestingly, SSI has almost exactly the characteristics recommended
by Briar and others for a cash-transfer program that encourages recipients to feel
like "rights-bearing citizens." See Briar, supra, at 383-85; Cahn & Cahn, The War
on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317, X329-31 (1964).
87 See 42 U.S.C. § 1381a (Supp. I1, 1973); H.R. REP. No. 92-23x, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 25 (1971).
"sSee N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, X973, at 22, col. 4; 119 CONG. REC. S23,8o6 (daily
ed. Dec. 21, 1973) (remarks of Sen. Dole commending Kansas' "outreach" pro-
gram); N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1973, at 43, col. 2 (similar outreach program in New
York State). The presence or absence of a public policy of seeking out eligible per-
sons and notifying them of the availability of an income-support program may now
be the single characteristic most typical of programs closer to right than to gratuity.
See generally Note, Welfare Law- 972 Social Security Act Amendments - Supple-
mental Security Income for the Aged, Blind and Disabled, 58 CORNELL L. REV.
803 (i973). Both the food stamp, see Bennett v. Butz, 386 F. Supp. xo59 (D.
Minn. 1974), and medicaid programs, see Woodruff v. Lavine, 399 F. Supp. xoo8
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), require such "outreach" efforts. No similar effort could be
imagined in AFDC. In England seventy-five years ago, however, the difference
between an "of right" and a "gratuitous" benefit program was whether recipients
were disenfranchised. See A. V. DiCEY, LEcTUREs ON THE RELATION BETWEEN
LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY XXXIV-
xxxv (2d ed. 1914).
" See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (Supp. III, z973); 39 Fed. Reg. 28,626 (0974)
("conditions that are as protective of people's dignity as possible," § 426.11o(c)).
g042 U.S.C. § 1381 (Supp. III, 1973).
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gram's means test 9 ' destroy any pretense that an individual has
contributed toward his own protection, a recipient is much better
off than those who must rely on AFDC or general relief. SSI bene-
fits are not only administered differently; they have been rising
with the cost of living in a period when AFDC benefits have re-
mained constant or have been reduced. s
SSI recipients are thus encouraged to feel that their non-
employment is excused, that they suffer from a sad accident of
fate, and that society accepts responsibility for their support. On
the other hand, everyone else who needs income support must
almost by definition be a person whose poverty is his own fault.
This group may be denied public income support altogether.
9 3
Even when persons receive AFDC or general relief benefits, the
checks are normally smaller than SSI payments and are often
accompanied by moralistic lectures or "work requirements" that
assume a propensity for indolence.9 4 Perhaps more important, an
AFDC or general relief recipient is "on welfare," and cannot es-
cape the message - from potential employers, from his children's
teachers and friends, and from his own family -that he has
failed and is supported only by the ultimate grudging charity of a
stern society. 5
Inherent in Congress' decision to separate the three SSI cate-
gories from AFDC must have been a notion that SSI recipients
deserve better of society than those who can only qualify for
AFDC.9" The new SSI administrative arrangements translated that
01Id. § 1382.
9' Even before SSI took effect, benefits were increased, Pub. L. No. 93-368, 88
Stat 422 (1973). SSI benefits now automatically increase to cover inflation. See 42
U.S.C.A. § i382f (1974).
There are several quirks in the SSI/AFDC equation. Using national standards,
SSI pays at levels that seem high in Mississippi but low in California. The federal
government holds a state "harmless" for case-load growth only to the extent that it
supplements federal payment schedules to the levels at which the state was paying
in December 1973. Thus, especially with recent high inflation, AFDC benefits
in a few states are now higher than SSI levels. There are also differences in the
methods of computing benefits that can make large differences to many par-
ticipants. AFDC in New York pays rent plus the established support level; SSI
is straight cash. With rents so high, AFDC can be a better deal. These issues are
discussed in N.Y. STATE ASSEMBLY STANDING COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SERVICES,
HEARING REPORT: PROBLEMS IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM
(1974).
" See A. LAFRANCE, M. SCHROEDER, R. BEN='r & W. BoYD, LAW OF THIE
POOR §§ 305, 309 (1973).
" See, e.g., New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405
(X973); CALIF. WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE §§ 11300, 1365o (1972). See
generally Comment, The Failure of the Work Incentive (WIN) Program, I19 U.
PA. L. REv. 485 (1971).
05See note 86 supra.
," "[YJour committee believes that the American people do not want a system
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statutory assumption into more favorable benefits and less onerous
procedural requirements for SSI recipients. But how did Congress
define the subgroup of the needy who should receive this special
treatment?
B. SSI: The Qualification Questions
In composing a statutory definition of SSI disability, Congress
tracked the language that now describes Social Security disa-
bility qualification. An applicant must be "unable to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically de-
terminable physical or mental impairment" likely to result in
death or extend for twelve months; 97 and medical inability to
work is to be determined "regardless of whether a specific job
vacancy exists for him or whether he would be hired if he applied
for work." 9s But, as was argued above, the important fact about
Social Security disability is its coverage of those who have won a
place in the labor force and been struck from it by medical
tragedy. Thus Congress' use of the Social Security disability
definition in the SSI law was psittacistic. SSI can take Social
Security's words but not its meaning, because the SSI test will
generally be applied to persons who have never worked.9 9
The distinction between the two programs can be illuminated
by considering the eligibility of a person in the job gap. Such an
applicant will be someone whose medical impairment prevents
attainment of his full potential as a worker, who can nonetheless
do some work, but who finds none. With respect to Social Security
disability, it was argued above that the clarifying question ought
to be whether all workers should be able to feel secure against
income loss occasioned by medical disability in an unfavorable
labor market. Under this test, and under Kerner, the job gap ap-
plicant would receive Social Security disability benefits if he has
a record of sufficient prior work at covered employment. Under
SSI, however, the touchstone of expectation that requires Social
Security disability coverage is not available, because SSI appli-
which results in promoting welfare as a way of life. [Therefore, we have at-
tempted to provide] adequate assistance to those who cannot help themselves,
while . . . maximiz[ing] the incentive and the obligation of those who are able
to work to help themselves." H.R. RERS. No. 92-231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1971).
97 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(3)(A) (Supp. III, 1973).9 Id. § 1382C(3)(B).
" A hint that the plagiarized definition is a result of bureaucratic routine
rather than legislative choice is its use again when Congress almost enacted an in-
come tax exemption for the disabled in s971. See H.R. REP. No. 92-7o8, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 49 (1971).
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cants will generally have failed to establish a place in the work-
force.'00
As the SSI statute is currently written, ineligibility of job gap
claimants is clear. Congress' incorporation into SSI of the post-
Kerner Social Security disability definition denies benefits to such
persons. In deciding whether SSI exclusion is appropriate, it is
useful to note the differences between the SSI welfare estate and
that just below - the work-search and employment lecture re-
quirements. The absence of these requirements in SSI indicates
that SSI recipients ought to be persons for whom such require-
ments are otiose. Thus, if an individual can work, SSI tells him
that he should be making the same efforts as one with no medical
explanation for his decline but similar skills and prospects. On
the other hand, the SSI program does seem to accord special social
legitimacy to the persons it benefits, and medical infirmity is the
key to this favored status. But since ability to work, and thus to
"profit" from work-search requirements, also seems to be a con-
sideration in SSI's exclusion of the partially disabled, it is per-
haps defensible to conclude that a person thrust into the job gap
by a medical occurrence who can still work should be ineligible
for SSI disability.
A number of other outcomes required by the current SSI
statute are not so easily comprehended. Consider the following
cases:
(i) the person who suffers a terrible automobile accident at
age 16, will be in bed for years, and will be unable to earn the
minimum wage;
(2) the person born with very low levels of intelligence and
physical coordination, who will be at the end of every job
queue, and will work only if the economy achieves something
approaching full employment;
(3) the mother of two children under four, whose husband,
a student, dies of a heart attack; she could work, but her wages
will not defray the cost of child care,' 0 and no subsidized day-
care facility is available;
(4) the heroin addict who has on four separate occasions en-
100 There is an overlap between SSI and Social Security, however. Nearly half
a million Social Security disability beneficiaries receive so little that they also
qualify for SSI. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 44 U.S.L.W. 4224, 4231 n.27 (U.S. Feb.
24, 1976). These persons are permitted to disregard only the first twenty dollari
per month of Social Security benefits in calculating their SSI "need." See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382a(b)(2) (Supp. III, 1973).
'
0 See C. SCBHULTZF, E. FRIEn, A. RivIwN & N. TEETERs, SETTING NATIONAL.
PRIORITiES: THE 1973 BMGET 256-8S (Brookings Inst. 1972).
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tered a methadone program, become stabilized, started work,
suffered emotional turmoil, quit the job, and then resumed
heroin abuse.
The SSI statute provides disability benefits only in Case (I).
Case (2) may approach mental retardation, and if the doctors
are willing to describe the individual as mentally impaired, the
hearing officers will award disability benefits. But, as the indi-
vidual is described here, he is not sick but is "only" someone who
will almost never be employed in our economy. Therefore he may
be eligible for AFDC or general relief, but he cannot qualify for
SSI.
The mother in Case (3) is in no way physically afflicted. Her
need is not caused by a permanently high-unemployment economy.
She is a single parent, in a society that incongruously emphasizes
the importance of both work and child care while providing in-
sufficient publicly subsidized facilities for the children of work-
ing parents.1°2 Although she is the paradigm case for AFDC bene-
fits, when she seeks those benefits she will be entangled in what
will seem to her a bureaucratic nightmare: work requirements but
few jobs, and no suggestions for care of the children.
Case (4) is more complicated. The American Psychiatric
Association says heroin addiction is a disease,10 3 but the SSI statute
requires whole-hearted participation in a treatment program. 04
This individual is capable of that, but not steadily. When he is
in treatment, he can work. But, before long, he is likely to resume
drug abuse. Taking only SSI's general qualification clauses, this
might be a difficult case. Is the addict "unable" to work or only
unwilling? Is his shortcoming a "medically determinable . . .
impairment" or only a severe emotional maladjustment? Is the
inability sufficiently permanent? Congress has, however, specif-
ically required treatment of those addicted to alcohol and drugs as
a condition of SSI eligibility. If comprehensible at all, these re-
quirements must represent a legislative judgment that there can-
not be an "inability" to participate in treatment, or at least that
no such inability can be a sufficiently "medical" failing.
Thus the distinctions required to select the persons who are
disabled from those who are merely in need must reflect two dif-
ferent sorts of public judgments. First, they show a policy of
102 Cf. Loveless v. Weinberger, 492 F.2d 1291, 1293 (6th Cir. 1974) (denying
Social Security coverage for a quarter in which claimant took care of her grand-
children, and rejecting the argument that "the first and most important 'trade or
business' of plaintiff's daughter . . . was to care for her minor children").
'°' Se COMMITTEE ON NOENCLATURE AND STATISTICS OF THE AMERICAN
PSYcHIATRIc AsSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL Dis-
ORDERs 92 (2d ed. 1968).
10442 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(3) (Supp. III, 1973).
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imposing work rules on needy persons who are healthy enough to
work. The restrictions may be difficult or impossible to administer
successfully. They may be a poor substitute for incentive arrange-
ments by which work would pay better than non-work. But, if
we are unwilling to raise low wages substantially, and also un-
willing to reduce AFDC and general relief benefit levels, many
welfare recipients will have no financial incentive to obtain jobs.
We respond to that problem by giving benefits only on a showing
of work-search, and by denying them on certain showings of un-
justified refusal of or departure from work.
If this were the only purpose of the administrative require-
ments attached to the remaining non-federalized assistance pro-
grams, SSI disability would have a clear focus. It would be the
category of those who ought not be subjected to work-search: be-
cause we will pay them whether they look or not; we are positive
they will not find anything; or, on balance, we would just as soon
not have them working."0 5 So defined, SSI would include all the
105 The matter is not quite this simple. The Social Security program has never
sought to discourage eligible persons from obtaining benefits, and indeed has had a
positive goal of enticing persons beyond retirement age from the labor force. See 42
U.S.C. § 403 (1970). SSI is, among other things, a "welfare" program, and there-
fore a category which everyone should seek to avoid. To help persons escape SSI,
the program "taxes" attempts to achieve economic independence quite mildly. See
id. § 1382a(b) (4) (Supp. III, 1973). Thus a person must be entirely unable to work
'in order to qualify for SSI disability benefits, but can then become able to do some
work and still retain some of his SSI benefits as he achieves a low income. These
provisions expose apparently conflicting public,'goals: the requirement of absolute
dependency as a condition of qualification, yet the rejection of arrangements, e.g.,
a ioo percent tax, that might discourage work efforts. But the goals are not neces-
sarily in conflict. Consider, for example, the cases of physically handicapped persons
who can work productively with training, emotional support, and workplace ad-
justments. Or consider persons with past or present alcohol and drug problems, who
can move gradually toward capacity and dignity if supported in the right way.
For many such persons, a cost-benefit analysis will not justify the amount of
remedial service needed to permit labor-force participation. The government would
gain financially if it declared these persons disabled and supported them, rather
than taking the steps necessary to permit them to work. Yet other values-
dignity, equity, justice-argue for rehabilitation expenditures, which should be
seen as a public obligation to the disabled individuals rather than as prudent con-
servation of the fisc. See generally Farber, The Handicapped Plead for Entrance
- Will Anyone Answer? 64 Ky. L.J. 99 (1975). It may be that a stated separa-
tion between the disabled and the unemployed, the two groups divided by society's
conclusion about whether they need work, would hinder some rehabilitative efforts
that are assisted by the fuzzy overlaps among existing programs. But, at least in
theory, it is possible for society's attitude toward the disabled to be: "You need
not work; minimal support is available; but if you desire rehabilitation, it too
is available; and it will seek to bring you to the highest possible level of capacity."
Such a policy could, for example, justify public expenditures for child care services
that permit mothers to work, even where their earnings are less than the cost of
child care. See note xoi supra.
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cases described above. In cases (i), (2), and (4) work incen-
tives are more trouble than they are worth for both the adminis-
trators and the recipient. The mother in case (3) ought not be
required to seek work because she can do more social good at home
than in a low-wage job. But SSI does not go this far, because it
applies only to persons with a "medically determinable" inability
to work. A policy of encouraging work cannot explain this restric-
tion, because SSI denies benefits to many persons whom any sensi-
ble inquiry would classify as extremely unlikely to achieve a place
in the workforce.
The boundaries of SSI must therefore reflect a second factor,
a moral judgment. In this view, the program describes not only
persons who cannot work, but persons whom we are willing to
anoint as legitimately unable to work. The requirement of "medi-
cal" disability functions to demarcate those whose poverty is
sympathetic from those who are poor without excuse. We say of
those medically unable to work that their circumstance deserves
more sympathy, and more money, than the circumstance of others
whose economic situation is as desperate but whose reason is
different. Thus this law creates not only economic outcomes, and
not only bureaucratic arrangements for carrying out its economic
policies, but also a further refinement of the system of socially
and morally explicit categories into which welfare laws distribute
the citizenry.
C. SSI as an Attempt to Confer Social Status
Stating that SSI disability assigns a status does not explain why
the line has been drawn where it has. Deterrence alone is not a
sufficient explanation. The persons represented by cases (i), (2),
(3), and (4) appear equally unable to affect their present circum-
stances, and yet only case (i) qualifies for SSI. Perhaps we fear
that the availability of unstigmatized benefits will encourage un-
desirable conduct in the future. "Medical" may thus be short-
hand for events entirely outside the influence of an individual, and
thus entirely unaffected by the possible incentive effect of rela-
tively generous income support. As a factual matter, however,
such an assumption seems dubious. Cases (2), (3), and (4) seem
consequences of general social and cultural phenomena more than
of individual planning. Our society may revere medicine and sym-
pathize with the sick, but it holds no views that could explain dis-
tinctions between persons totally unable to work according to
whether their condition results from an illness or, on the other
hand, from limited natural abilities, decades of racism or sexism,
homosexuality, family burdens, technological change, a broken
home, or national fiscal policy.
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A better explanation is that the categories SSI creates are as-
signed classifications of social standing, a modern version of the
traditional estates real that classified individuals according to
their relationship to the land."0 6 SSI thus implements fundamental
choices by Congress about the nature of the relationship that a
large group of citizens should have to each other and to the state.
Congress could have brought old, blind, and disabled low-income
persons within Social Security. It rejected this alternative pre-
sumably because it would have destroyed a distinction believed
important - that between insurance and welfare. A second al-
ternative was also rejected. Benefits for those of the poor who are
old, blind, or disabled could have been increased without altering
the structure of the former categorical programs. But Congress
was plainly ready to make a social value judgment about these
persons, to declare their poverty to be a matter largely beyond
their individual control, and to accept national responsibility for
their support.10 7 A preference was expressed, legislatively and then
administratively, for the social benefits of unstigmatized, reliable
income *support for this large group of recipients. 0 8
When the society assigns a status such as SSI eligibility, it
100 See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) ; Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (i965).
See also E. GorrimAN, STIGEA 137 (paperback ed. 1969):
Although these proposed philosophies of life, these recipes of being, are
presented as though from the stigmatized individual's personal point of view,
on analysis it is apparent that something else informs them. This something
else is groups, in the broad sense of like-situated individuals, and this is only
to be expected, since what an individual is, or could be, derives from the
place of his kind in the social structure.
One of these groups is the aggregate formed by the individual's fellow-
sufferers ....
107 For a prescient argument that the distinction between employable and un-
employable welfare recipients, while crude, is useful because the taxpaying public
has more difficulty accepting welfare programs that benefit employable persons,
see Handler & Hollingsworth, Work, Welfare, and the Nixon Reform Proposals, 22
STAN. L. REV. 907 (970).
'1 Obviously it would be wrong to assume that a "disabled" stamp can be
placed on a person without stigmatizing him. See Maclean & Jefferys, Disability
and Deprivation, in POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND CRAss STRUCTuRE 165, 172 (D. Wed-
derburn ed. I974). The real questions are the conduct to be approved and en-
couraged by particular social categories, the groups thereby to be formed for
political contest, and the attitudes categorized persons are to be permitted to take
to themselves. In Goffman's language:
It should be plain that ... advocated codes of conduct provide the stig-
matized individual not merely with a platform and a politics, and not merely
with instruction as to how to treat others, but with recipes for an appropriate
attitude regarding the self. To fail to adhere to the code is to be a self-
deluded, misguided person; to succeed is to be both real and worthy ....
E. GoFrmtw, supra note io6, at 135. Accepting difficulties in applying concepts
such as these to real-world facts, it seems fair to conclude that SSI is a step forward




tells a person how he should regard himself and how he should
conduct some of his relationships with others.10 Thus when the
SSI groups were separated from AFDC recipients, but not given
quite the same treatment as Social Security participants, SSI
recipients were told that they too had a group to look down upon,
but that they still had to look up at those who have worked. As
the statute classifies the population into sub-groups officially
determined to be appropriate, it gives SSI recipients a regular in-
come and a shred of legitimacy at the expense of the reclassifica-
tion of those below them, who have once again failed to achieve
recognition.
SSI can therefore be seen as an attempt to transfer, in its
definition of disability, nonmonetary benefits to recipients through
the knowledge that a substantial group has been judged less
worthy. Indeed, an important determinant of Social Security
policy has been a widely held belief that recipients' feelings of
entitlement and legitimacy depend on exclusion of the undeserv-
ing.
But if welfare categories are drawn in a way that divides
the population according to rankings of moral legitimacy, the
bounds of the categories must be tested against a larger scheme
of shared values, a test the new SSI definition cannot pass. The
significance of SSI is that it exempts its recipients from work-
search requirements and legitimates dependency with its implicit
declaration that recipients are out of work for approved reasons.
Yet, as we have seen, all four of the example cases, as well as the
medically disabled, are persons we ought to spare from work re-
quirements. All four should therefore receive minimal income
support without proving their willingness to work and should be
designated as excusably removed from the working population.
If we are to take seriously Congress' creation of an intermediate
social welfare estate in SSI, one between the state-created ex-
pectations of Social Security recipients and the plight of the un-
deserving poor, then the current limitation of SSI benefits to
those who are totally disabled by medical causes should be aban-
doned. Congress should be regarded as having said that our
society has one form of insurance that attaches to wage-earners
when they work and pay Social Security taxes, and that we now
have another form, SSI, that is applicable at birth to all citizens.
109 See E. GoFFmAN, supra note io6, at 168:
The member who is defined as physically sick is in somewhat the same sit-
uation [as the member of a group who is authorized to be deviant be-
cause he is regarded as eminent]; if he properly handles his sick status he
can deviate from performance standards without this being taken as a reflec-
tion on him or on his relation to the group. The eminent and the sick can be
free, then, to be deviators precisely because their deviation can be fully
discounted, leading to no re-identification; their special situation demonstrates
they are anything but deviants -in the common understanding of that term.
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The SSI estate is financed by general taxes and should protect
those people who - it is generally felt - ought to receive bene-
fits because they have been victims of occurrences that might strike
any person, and because we are prepared to say that these persons
need not work. Even if the economy were running well, and jobs
were available for all who wanted them, we would not expect these
persons to work; or at least we would be willing to support them
whether or not they sought to work. 110 The logic of SSI thus re-
quires that the income support commitments undertaken in that
program be extended to all those whom we do not expect to work
but who are excluded by SSI's arbitrary "medical" qualification.
11
o The distinction is at least 300 years old. For example, the Old Poor Law,
43 Eliz., c. 2 (16oi), distinguished between "(i.) the children of parents unable to
keep and maintain them; (2.) such persons who, having no means to maintain
themselves, used no ordinary and daily trade of life to get their living by; (3.)
the lame, impotent, old, blind, and such others as were poor and not able to work.
The first two of these classes were to be relieved by being set to work. The third
alone were to be relieved without work." Attorney-General v. Guardians of the
Poor of the Merthyr Tydfil Union, [igool i Ch. 516, 541.
